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If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could
be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has
the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious expe-
rience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked
into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a
symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event
memory – a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems
in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity
rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of
unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. Integrat-
ing object information (derived from the ventral visual stream and orbitofrontal cortex) with
contextual emotional information (from the anterior insula) and spatial environmental infor-
mation (from the dorsal visual stream), the hippocampus rapidly forms event codes that
have the informational content of objects embedded in an emotional and spatiotemporally
extending context. Event codes, formed in the CA3-dentate network for the purpose of
their memorization, are not only contextualized but also allocentric representations, simi-
larly to conscious experiences of events and objects situated in a seemingly objective and
observer-independent framework of phenomenal space and time. Conscious perception,
creating the spatially and temporally extending world that we perceive around us, is likely
to be evolutionarily related to more fleeting and seemingly internal forms of conscious
experience, such as autobiographical memory recall, mental imagery, including goal antic-
ipation, and to other forms of externalized conscious experience, namely dreaming and
hallucinations; and evidence pointing to an important contribution of the hippocampus to
these conscious phenomena will be reviewed.
Keywords: consciousness, default-mode network, emotional feelings, episodic memory, hallucinations, mental
imagery, schizophrenia, θ oscillations
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive-neuroscience theories of consciousness suggest that
consciousness arises from stable patterns of activation in widely
distributed brain areas. Synchrony and resonance between dis-
tributed networks that are activated above threshold would “bind”
different perceptual features into a unitary conscious experience
(reviewed in Atkinson et al., 2000). Conscious experience, as
opposed to unconscious processing, of external stimuli has indeed
been associated with synchronized neuronal activity across widely
distributed neocortical areas, including parietal areas (Palva et al.,
2005; Melloni et al., 2007). The question remains as to how the
information content of consciousness can be derived from dis-
tributed neocortical modules that are specialized for processing
stimuli in relation to functions of attention, working memory,
and action disposition or preparation; and that, in posterior pari-
etal areas, encode stimuli in egocentric, action-oriented frames of
reference (Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Andersen and Buneo, 2002),
whereas, consciously, stimuli are perceived in an allocentric frame
of reference, that is, in the external context of space and time.
The hippocampus is concerned with continuously recording
attended experience, forming memories of events as they happen
in their spatiotemporal context (Burgess et al., 2001; Morris et al.,
2003; Kubik et al., 2007) and linking event codes into episodic
memories, that is, “sequences of events that unfold over time
and space” (Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2005). The hippocampus
also plays a critical role in episodic memory recall – a func-
tion that is closely related to mental imagery or internal sim-
ulation of goals or outcomes (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter and
Addis, 2007). If we were to argue that episodic memory forma-
tion is similarly closely related to conscious experience of the
seemingly external world, then the neural mechanism underly-
ing episodic memory functions should be closely related, if not
identical, to the neural mechanism underpinning consciousness.
The hippocampus would “bind” consciousness in as much as
it is acting to bind and encode episodic (declarative) memo-
ries. The formation of event memories involves the integration
of object information and spatiotemporal information into a
unique representation through processes of pattern separation and
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completion in the hippocampus, especially the dentate gyrus and
hippocampal region CA3 (Kesner, 2007; Rolls, 2007). Neocortical
processes representing features of objects and their external con-
text converge onto a single pattern of neuronal activity rapidly
emerging in region CA3. It is proposed that patterns of activ-
ity forming in the autoassociation network of CA3 at each cycle
of the local θ rhythm encode attended experience and have the
informational content of objects or events embedded in an allo-
centric context – the informational content of unitary conscious
experience.
Moreover, the hippocampus forms a representation of the ani-
mal’s environmental context, that is, the animal’s place within
its environment, and plays a key role in navigation across spa-
tial contingencies of the environment (O’Keefe, 1976; Brun et al.,
2002; Anderson and Jeffery, 2003). In many species, places occu-
pied by the animal are characterized by visual landmarks; and
what we experience consciously may be an epiphenomenon of a
process that maps view-dependent allocentric information about
landmarks onto view-independent place representations. Land-
marks situated in a spatial context could have evolved into situated
objects that are linked to emotional behavior modes, while the
spatial context, in which objects are embedded or events occur,
evolved into a more general framework of space and time; con-
sistent with the proposed derivation of phenomenal time form
phenomenal space (Boroditsky, 2000). By recurrently forming
representations of landmarks or objects that are situated in a spa-
tiotemporal context, the hippocampus creates phenomenal space
and time, consistent with philosophical insights that the frame-
work of space and time that appears to surround us is not an objec-
tive reality but a fundamentally subjective creation (Schopenhauer,
1844/1966).
Reviewing theories of consciousness, Zeman (2001) concluded
that “no theory of this kind satisfactorily explains what phenom-
enal awareness contributes to information processing” (p. 1281).
Contemporary theories of consciousness tend to assume that“con-
sciousness makes a difference” and “plays an important, more or
less continuous role in directing our waking behavior” (Zeman,
2001, p. 1282). However, psychophysical evidence suggests that
“consciousness arises too late to perform the kinds of function
which these theories envisage,” so that, perhaps,“rather than guid-
ing action from moment to moment, consciousness serves its
biological purpose on a longer,more reflective, time scale”(Zeman,
2001, p. 1281). It was Chalmers’ (1996) proposal that, because
“consciousness involves a separate class of non-physical proper-
ties,”“subjective qualities of experience” cannot “make a difference
to the physical trajectory of human behavior” (as reviewed in
Zeman, 2001, p. 1284). Indeed, from our first-person perspec-
tive, we have no access to the physical trajectory of behavior or to
mechanisms executing behavior, as they are part of a realm beyond
our conscious experience (Behrendt, 2007). The behavior executed
in the physical realm is not what we experience consciously. The
behavior of which we are aware is but an awareness of behavior –
evidence perhaps for a reflective or mnemonic process, or evidence
for a process that dynamically characterizes our current situation
(or position) in a multidimensional spatiotemporal state space
and that allows the organism to unconsciously respond to stimuli
in a situationally appropriate manner.
CONVERGENCE OF DORSAL AND VENTRAL VISUAL
PROCESSING STREAMS
Object-related information, processed by the ventral visual stream,
and action-related spatial information, processed by the dorsal
visual stream, converge in the hippocampal formation in the
medial temporal cortex. The ventral visual stream courses via
the occipitotemporal cortex, the anterior lateral temporal cortex
(a unimodal association area representing visual objects, as well
as social cues, in terms of conjunctions of qualities or features),
the perirhinal cortex [an area that processes novelty, familiarity,
or recency of objects (Brown and Aggleton, 2001; Pihlajamäki
et al., 2004; Eichenbaum et al., 2007)], and the lateral entorhi-
nal cortex [which, too, plays an important role in recognition
memory, including the recognition of individual conspecifics
(Petrulis et al., 2005)] to the anterior hippocampus (head of
the hippocampus) (Kahn et al., 2008; Kravitz et al., 2011). The
dorsal visual stream runs via the occipitoparietal cortex to the
lateral posterior parietal cortex (superior and inferior parietal
lobules), where salient visual stimuli are encoded in frames of
reference relative to parts of the body and the eye (egocentric
reference frames) for the purpose of guiding particular types
of motor acts, forming “action-oriented spatial representations”
(Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Ander-
sen and Buneo, 2002). The dorsal visual stream trifurcates into the
parietoprefrontal pathway (connecting the inferior parietal lob-
ule with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and subserving spatial
working memory), the parietopremotor pathway (connecting the
superior parietal lobule with dorsal premotor regions and subserv-
ing unconscious visually guided actions), and the “parieto-medial
temporal pathway” (playing a crucial role in spatial navigation)
(Kravitz et al., 2011). The “parieto-medial temporal pathway”
courses from the inferior parietal lobule directly to structures in
the medial temporal lobe; and it courses indirectly via medial pari-
etal lobe structures to the medial temporal lobe (Kravitz et al.,
2011).
The rostral portion of the inferior parietal lobule is special-
ized for guiding manual actions in peripersonal space (reaching,
grasping, holding, placing) and projects to the ventral premotor
cortex, which encodes object-guided manual actions. It is the cau-
dal portion of the inferior parietal lobule that is specialized for
processing distal space information necessary for guiding navi-
gational behavior; and it is this region that projects directly to
structures in the medial temporal lobe, including hippocampal
region CA1 and the posterior parahippocampal cortex, as well
as to regions of the medial parietal lobe, including the retrosple-
nial cortex and posterior cingulate cortex (reviewed in Kravitz
et al., 2011). The retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortices,
receiving spatial information processed in lateral posterior pari-
etal regions (especially the inferior parietal lobule), project to
the posterior parahippocampal cortex and the entorhinal cor-
tex in the medial temporal lobe. The posterior parahippocampal
cortex, in turn, projects via the medial entorhinal cortex to the
posterior hippocampus (body of the hippocampus) (reviewed in
Mohedano-Moriano et al., 2007). In humans, the inferior pari-
etal lobule, retrosplenial cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, pos-
terior parahippocampal cortex, and posterior hippocampus are
functionally connected with each other (as shown by correlations
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between spontaneous BOLD signal fluctuations in these regions
at rest) (Kahn et al., 2008).
Medial parietal areas represent spatial locations of landmarks or
salient objects that are visible from the animal’s current position.
While the lateral posterior parietal cortex encodes visual stimuli
in retinocentric and other egocentric coordinates, the retrosplenial
cortex, adjacent precuneus, and portions of the posterior cingulate
cortex in the medial parietal lobe encode navigationally relevant
landmarks in egocentric, head-centered coordinates (reflecting the
animal’s head direction) or in allocentric coordinates (“world
coordinates,” that is, coordinates that are “fixed” to the external
world) (Dean and Platt, 2006; Byrne et al., 2007; Kravitz et al.,
2011). The retrosplenial cortex and posterior cingulate cortex
contribute to the transformation of egocentric representations
into allocentric representations, which are found especially in the
medial temporal lobe (Byrne et al., 2007). The posterior parahip-
pocampal cortex, receiving information from the retrosplenial
cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, encodes landmarks and
their spatial arrangement, or places them within a spatial context
(reviewed in Burgess et al., 2001; Pihlajamäki et al., 2004; Kravitz
et al., 2011). The hippocampus, using “pattern completion” and
“attractor dynamics,” then embeds landmarks and objects in an
allocentric representation of the environment (Byrne et al., 2007).
DEFAULT-MODE NETWORK
The inferior parietal lobule and posteromedial parietal areas,
namely the posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and
precuneus, belong to the “default-mode network” (which also
includes ventromedial prefrontal cortex, mid-dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, anterior temporal cortex), which supports mental
processes during the conscious resting state (“default mode”) and
which is deactivated (or attenuated) during the performance of
goal-directed actions or cognitive tasks (Raichle et al., 2001; Buck-
ner et al., 2008). Default-mode network activity supports broad
information gathering about the world (broad attention) during
exploratory monitoring and monitoring for unexpected events,
enabling the detection, for example, of predators without the need
to intentionally allocate attentional resources (Gusnard et al., 2001;
Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008). The inferior parietal
lobule, especially in the right hemisphere, subserves the ability
to detect behaviorally relevant stimuli that are unrelated to the
present task; and a lesion in this region causes unilateral visuospa-
tial neglect (usually left-sided) (Halligan et al., 2003; Pessoa et al.,
2003). The posterior cingulate cortex and adjacent precuneus in
the medial parietal lobe represent the visual periphery and sup-
port broad monitoring of the external environment. Damage to
the medial parietal lobe, including the posterior cingulate and pre-
cuneus, causes an inability to perceive objects outside the focus of
attention (“simultanagnosia”). Broad monitoring of the external
world, allowing the animal to characterize the situation it faces,
may be the evolutionarily primary function of the default-mode
network.
A broad low-level focus of attention (relaxed attention) is
similarly adopted in association with internal cognition (intro-
spection). The default-mode network, when active in states of
rest, can gather information within the “internal environment” in
order to assess its salience for the individual, similarly to how it
surveys the external environment (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle
et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008). Related to this function is
the monitoring of the self. The precuneus, especially its ante-
rior portion, is a central node in the network activated during
mental imagery and “internal mentation.” The precuneus and the
wider medial prefrontal-mid-parietal network also play an impor-
tant role in conscious self-awareness, self-reflection, and cognition
about self-representations (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The self
can be bolstered by imagery of others’appreciative attitudes toward
ourselves, but the self is primarily a distillate of our position in,
or relatedness to, the social world around us. In social situations,
the default-mode network enables us to consider the thoughts
and perspectives of other people (Buckner et al., 2008) and, per-
haps especially, to monitor others’ attitudes toward ourselves and
toward the values or norms by which we define ourselves.
Activity in regions of the default-mode network correlates with
people’s proclivity to mind-wander and generate spontaneous
thoughts and mental images during periods of reduced central
executive demand (Mason et al., 2007). Evidently,“conscious infor-
mation in the form of mental images and spontaneous thoughts”
can be manipulated “for problem solving and planning” (Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006, p. 577). In the “absence of external task direc-
tion,” regions within the default-mode network “facilitate flexible
self-relevant mental explorations – simulations – that provide a
means to anticipate and evaluate upcoming events”(Buckner et al.,
2008,p. 2). Activity in posteromedial parietal areas, such as the pos-
terior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial cortex, increases not only
during the conscious resting state but also during lapses in focused
attention (Weissman et al., 2006). Attention lapses during task
performance, reflecting transient shifts from task-related network
to default-mode network activity, can be harnessed for outcome
simulation, goal setting, and decision making. The precuneus is
activated in association with imagery of action outcomes; and its
connection with rostral anterior cingulate cortex suggests that it
makes an important contribution to the guidance of voluntary
behavior by outcomes or goals anticipated in imagery (Krieghoff
et al., 2009).
Parietal regions that are part of the default-mode network
are functionally connected (showing correlated slow BOLD sig-
nal fluctuations) with the posterior parahippocampal cortex and
hippocampal formation (hippocampus and entorhinal cortex)
(Greicius et al., 2003, 2004; Vincent et al., 2006; Kahn et al., 2008),
suggesting that “the default-mode network is closely involved in
episodic memory processing” (Greicius et al., 2004, p. 4641). The
precuneus, posterior cingulate, retrosplenial cortex, and inferior
parietal lobule are indeed activated during the recall of visuospatial
or autobiographic memories (Cavanna and Trimble, 2006;Vincent
et al., 2006; Takashima et al., 2007), confirming that“recollection of
personally relevant memories is a component of the cognitive con-
tent of the default state” (Vincent et al., 2006, p. 3528). Conscious
(vivid and context-rich) recall of autobiographical memories was
shown to be associated not only with activation of the posterior
cingulate and precuneus but also with that of the left hippocam-
pus (Gilboa et al., 2004). The hippocampus, a key structure of the
episodic memory system, may bind experiential features during
the retrieval and conscious elaboration of past autobiographical
events (Addis et al., 2007). Imagery of future events of personal
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significance similarly activates the hippocampus, as well as medial
parietal regions, leading to the proposition that the ability of the
hippocampus to extract and recombine elements of past experi-
ences can be utilized for purposes of simulation of future events,
decision making, and prospective guidance of behavior (Addis
et al., 2007; Schacter and Addis, 2007).
Thus, default-mode network activity “involves retrieval and
manipulation of past events, both personal and general, in an effort
to solve problems and develop future plans” (Greicius et al., 2003,
p. 257); and even the internal generation of “action intentions
draws especially heavily on the prospective memory network”
(Krieghoff et al., 2009). The episodic memory system, including
hippocampus and default-mode network, extracts and recombines
elements of previous experience so as to simulate outcomes and
enable “evaluation regarding future approach or avoidance of sim-
ilar scenarios”; outcome simulation, based on recombination of
episodic memories, “enables one to consider whether a particular
situation would be approached or avoided if encountered” (Addis
et al., 2007). For example, simulation of future outcomes, triggered
by social cues emanating from the present situation, is accompa-
nied by fleeting experiences, in imagery, of social situations in
which one is appreciated or rejected by others. Such simulations
are “unconscious” in the sense that they are not readily acknowl-
edged to oneself or others. Simulation of social experience that
involves criticism or rejection, based on past experience, has the
effect of producing social inhibition or avoidance. It is interest-
ing to note that, in patients with schizophrenia, who tend to be
sensitive to social rejection and are often socially inhibited, default-
mode network activity is increased in association with more severe
hallucinations and delusions (Garrity et al., 2007) and greater
“emotional awareness for others” (Harrison et al., 2007).
In summary, the default-mode network may support char-
acterization of the present or an anticipated situation by pro-
viding relevant cues to the hippocampus, where newly formed
or recombined event memories may channel into a process of
self-localization with respect to a multidimensional state space
that captures contingencies of the external world, contingencies
that, in primates and especially humans, extend well beyond the
topographical layout and temporal cycles of the external physical
environment, to include social structures and norms organized
on multiple levels. Consciousness may be evidence for episodic
memory functions serving such self-localization, which, time and
again, sets the framework within which the organism uncon-
sciously responds to relevant external stimuli and performs appro-
priate habitual tasks. The default-mode network is in dynamic
competition with a neocortical network that subserves focused
attention and the translation of relevant stimuli into actions dur-
ing task performance (Greicius et al., 2003; Buckner et al., 2008).
The task-related (task-positive) network, competitively interact-
ing with the default-mode network, includes dorsolateral and
ventral prefrontal regions, lateral parietal regions (intraparietal
sulcus/posterior parietal cortex), and a middle temporal region, as
well as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Fox et al., 2005; Boly
et al., 2007). A transient shift from default-mode network activ-
ity to task-positive network activity, as broad attention shifts to
focused attention, facilitates the perception of task-related stimuli
during task performance (Weissman et al., 2006; Boly et al., 2007).
Perception of, and responding to, task-relevant stimuli may occur
outside consciousness, but it may well be the case that, especially
in humans, even the performance of seemingly routine activities
requires frequent switching between the two networks, giving rise
to an impression of continuous consciousness accompanying these
activities.
EPISODIC MEMORY
Posterior parietal regions that form part of the dorsal visual stream
send information via the parahippocampal cortex and medial
entorhinal cortex to the posterior hippocampus (corresponding to
the dorsal hippocampus in rodents) and thus influence the ongo-
ing recording of spatial experience by the posterior hippocampus.
Unimodal association areas of the neocortex that represent qual-
ities or features of objects provide information to the perirhinal
cortex, which, in turn, is connected via the lateral entorhinal area
with the anterior hippocampus (corresponding to the ventral hip-
pocampus in rodents). Perirhinal and lateral entorhinal areas are
interconnected with the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex. Infor-
mation about different rewards and punishers, represented in the
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, reaches the anterior hippocam-
pus via the lateral entorhinal cortex. The hippocampus associates
information about objects, their meaning, and their context, con-
veyed by inputs from the lateral and medial entorhinal areas, to
form relational memory representations (reviewed in Eichenbaum
et al., 2007). Hippocampal activity encodes events as conjunc-
tions of items and their contextual associations and links these
events sequentially to form episodic memories (Fortin et al., 2004;
Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2005). The hippocampus is engaged in
continuous recording of attended experience, recording arbitrary
“events” as they occur in their spatiotemporal context (Burgess
et al., 2001; Kubik et al., 2007). Having the “capacity to remember
the flow of events,” the hippocampus can “replay” these memories
“as a sequence of events and where they occurred in a previous
experience” (Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2004, p. 403). Neuroimag-
ing research in humans supports the notion that the hippocampus
plays an important role in encoding and retrieval of episodic mem-
ories, including autobiographical memories (Zeineh et al., 2003;
Gilboa et al., 2004; Eldridge et al., 2005; Prince et al., 2005), and in
the prediction of future events on the basis of a single prior experi-
ence of a sequence of events (an episode) (Kumaran and Maguire,
2007). The left hippocampus, in humans, represents sequential
aspects of episodic experiences and temporal aspects of autobi-
ographical memory, whereas the right hippocampus in humans
plays a greater role in spatial processing.
Within the hippocampus, region CA3, receiving inputs from
the entorhinal cortex, rapidly encodes complex memory repre-
sentations involving object information, reward information, and
contextual information about the “space out there” (allocentric
space), whereby the anterior (ventral) hippocampus is preferen-
tially concerned with non-spatial (object- and reward-related)
information, while the posterior (dorsal) hippocampus prefer-
entially processes spatial or contextual information (Rolls and
Xiang, 2005; Rolls et al., 2005; Ross and Eichenbaum, 2006; Kesner,
2007; Kubik et al., 2007; Rolls, 2007). CA2 is similar to CA3 in
many ways, but may play a special role in forming memories of
social encounters (in rodents) (Young et al., 2006). Layer II of the
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entorhinal cortex projects (via the perforant path) to the dentate
gyrus (granule cell layer) and regions CA3 and CA2. The dentate
gyrus (granule cell layer) sends axons (mossy fibers) to CA3 (but
less to CA2); and backprojections from CA3 return to the dentate
gyrus (making synaptic connections with mossy cells). Pyramidal
neurons in region CA3 are extensively interconnected via recurrent
axon collaterals (“autoassociative” connections) that terminate in
modifiable synapses. The high degree of internal connectivity and
effective synaptic plasticity in CA3 enable the rapid encoding of
a unique identifying pattern representing “arbitrary associations”
between information from the temporal cortex regarding the iden-
tity of an object and information from the parietal cortex regarding
the location of an object (reviewed in Morris et al., 2003; Kesner,
2007; Rolls, 2007). The neural network of the dentate gyrus, pro-
jecting via mossy fibers to CA3, implements a “pattern separation”
process, serving the creation, in CA3, of “orthogonal pattern repre-
sentations” of the environment (Kesner, 2007). As event memories
are sequentially encoded within the autoassociative network of
CA3, backprojections from CA3 pyramidal cells provide feedback
to the dentate gyrus, where the modification of synaptic connec-
tions between CA3 backprojections and mossy cells may link one
event memory with the next in a sequence (Lisman et al., 2005).
Unique identifying patterns formed in hippocampal region
CA3 may serve an indexing function (Morris et al., 2003), that
is, representations of events formed and stored in CA3 “can be
used to reactivate the content of the memory via the return pro-
jections to the neocortex” (p. 1494), but it is also possible that
event codes formed in CA3 may “reflect the content or context
of the event itself in some way” (Burgess et al., 2001, p. 1495).
Hippocampal region CA1 receives input from CA3 (and CA2)
via Schaffer’s collaterals and links several firing patterns in CA3 to
form a“whole scene”memory, a representation of the scene toward
which the animal orients (Robertson et al., 1998; Rolls, 2007).
CA1 also receives direct input from layer III of the entorhinal
cortex (again via the perforant path). Location-specific informa-
tion that reaches CA1 directly from the entorhinal cortex supports
the encoding, by ensemble firing in CA1, of the animal’s location
within its environment (Brun et al., 2002; Anderson and Jeffery,
2003; Morris et al., 2003; Kesner, 2007; Kubik et al., 2007). Ensem-
ble activity in CA3, but not in CA1, is sensitive to the content of a
scene or place in the environment; CA3 supports the retrieval of
memories about where an objects is in a scene (Robertson et al.,
1998; Rolls et al., 1998) or where a reward could be found in
the environment (Brun et al., 2002). When the animal recalls
prior experience during navigational decision making, neuronal
ensemble firing in CA3 transiently reconstructs a representation
of a location ahead of the animal (“non-local representation”)
(Johnson and Redish, 2007), which then entrains the CA1 net-
work (involving increased γ-frequency synchronization between
CA3 and CA1) (Montgomery and Buzsáki, 2007). Retrieval of a
previously formed pattern encoded in CA3 (representing an origi-
nal event) is initiated by direct entorhinal inputs (from layer II
via the perforant path to CA3) representing a partial retrieval
cue (fragments of a previous input pattern) (reviewed in Lis-
man et al., 2005; Kesner, 2007; Rolls, 2007). The proposition is
that the sequential event codes formed in CA3, possibly reflect-
ing the content and context of objects or events, underlies unitary
conscious experience of objects and events embedded in a spatio-
temporally extending world. What is consciously experienced may
be the informational content of CA3 neuronal ensembles rapidly
forming through attractor dynamics.
Pyramidal cells in the hippocampus fire synchronously at γ fre-
quencies. γ Oscillations in local field potentials recorded from the
hippocampus reflect rhythmic inhibitory postsynaptic currents
generated in pyramidal cells by parvalbumin-expressing basket
cells (GABAergic interneurons that synapse onto somata and ini-
tial axonal segments of pyramidal cells) (reviewed in Buzsáki,1996;
Montgomery and Buzsáki, 2007). During exploratory locomotion,
behavioral preparedness, attentiveness to stimuli, and REM sleep,
γ oscillatory activity in the hippocampus (including the den-
tate gyrus) and entorhinal cortex is modulated by θ oscillations
(which are controlled by cholinergic and GABAergic input from
the medial septum) (Chrobak and Buzsáki, 1998; Hasselmo, 2006).
θOscillations in the hippocampus enhance memory encoding and
ensure continuous gathering of information about the environ-
ment (reviewed in Buzsáki,1996;Vertes,2005). While synchronous
γ-rhythmic activity of CA3 pyramidal neurons that is tuned to the
θ rhythm may be necessary for the temporary storage of sequences
of event memories, θ-modulated neuronal assembly firing in CA1
encodes the animal’s location and the track along which it nav-
igates (reviewed in Buzsáki and Draguhn, 2004; Buzsáki, 2005;
Shapiro and Ferbinteanu, 2006). The learning of sequential items
in an episodic memory task involves θ oscillations, in the same
way that θ is required for the coding of sequential places along a
track. θ Periods are necessary for tying together in time neuronal
assemblies representing sequential events whatever their nature
(Buzsáki, 2005). θ Rhythm, which can also be found in structures
around the Papez circuit (Vertes et al., 2004) as well as in neocor-
tical regions, may coordinate neuronal activity in hippocampus,
medial temporal and medial parietal regions, and even lateral neo-
cortical regions, during navigational tasks (Caplan et al., 2003)
or tasks involving the recall of episodic memories (reviewed in
Kahana, 2006; Byrne et al., 2007).
VanRullen and Koch (2003) argued that θ oscillations, acting
as a carrier for γ oscillations, provide the context for conscious
memory recall, whereas α oscillations would provide the context
for conscious perceptual experiences, which would be consistent
with psychophysical findings indicative of the discrete nature of
conscious perception. Recall of episodic memories in imagery may
not be too different from conscious perception, in that conscious
perception is always also a recall or recognition of what has been
perceived before. The difference between memory recollection and
perception, insofar as these are considered to be conscious phe-
nomena, may boil down to the difference between fleeting experi-
ence of seemingly private events and more substantial awareness of
an external world, which is really also a fundamentally private and
subjective experience (Schopenhauer,1844/1966; Behrendt,2007).
Given that perception of seemingly external events and imagery
of seemingly internal events are, on a deeper level, phenomeno-
logically identical, and are, in any event, likely to be evolutionarily
closely related, they should be attributable to the same process,
namely self-organizing patterns emerging at each wave of the θ
rhythm in the autoassociation network CA3. Unique patterns that
form in CA3, due to recurrent attractor dynamics, are event codes
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that capture arbitrary associations between objects and their con-
text and that, in a dimension orthogonal to the physical reality
of such processes, manifest as discrete elements of the stream of
consciousness. Consciousness is a moment-to-moment reflection
of self-organizing pattern formation, recurring at θ rate, in CA3.
Whilst these patterns do influence behavior, consciousness – the
flow of symbols ascribed to the sequence of event codes – does
not. The consciously experienced world, including phenomenal
space and time, is orthogonal to, and thus inconsequential for, the
physical world, as recognized by Chalmers (1996).
EMOTIONAL FEELINGS
Olfactory system and hippocampus evolved from a common sys-
tem concerned with sensing diffusible molecules in the environ-
ment (exteroception) (reviewed in Lathe,2001). The hippocampus
plays a critical role in navigation, and the same could be said, per-
haps, about the structure from which the hippocampus evolved.
A primitive form of allocentric information, in accordance with
which the organism’s place preference and place avoidance behav-
ior could be controlled, may have derived from the chemical
composition of the environment. As brain ventricles that were
originally exposed to the external milieu closed in the course of
phylogenesis, and as, therefore, the hippocampus lost its extero-
ceptive function, allocentric information came to be sourced from
visual or auditory modalities, instead, while the olfactory system
remained responsive to the external chemical milieu, although
the hippocampus (especially the ventral or anterior hippocampus
in rodents or primates, respectively) continues to process olfac-
tory information, too (reviewed in Bannerman et al., 2004). As
the hippocampus ceased to be exposed to the external chemical
milieu, and as navigation became landmark-based, the hippocam-
pus took on a new function: that of “sensing” the hormonal
and metabolic milieu of the organism (enteroception) (Lathe,
2001). Lying alongside the cerebral ventricles and the vascular
choroid plexus, the hippocampus is accessible to hormones and
metabolites present in the cerebrospinal fluid or circulating in the
blood stream. Hippocampal function is indeed modulated by a
great variety of hormones and metabolites, which Lathe (2001)
thought enables the hippocampus to “sense” internal states such
as hunger, thirst, fatigue, stress, fever, and malaise, “in much the
same way as the olfactory system can sense external substances
(exteroception)” (p. 217).
Events can occur, and objects can be found, in a context that
is not only spatial and temporal in nature but also emotional.
Consciously experienced, that is, situated or situationally embed-
ded, events or objects can be associated with emotional value.
Sensing internal hormones and metabolites and representing the
organism’s internal milieu, the hippocampus can use enteroceptive
information for the formation of emotional memory associa-
tions (Lathe, 2001). Not only internal states of hunger or thirst
but also states of pain can be used as unconditioned stimuli
for associative learning. The hippocampus makes a contribution
to pain responsiveness and pain awareness (reviewed in Lathe,
2001), which may be important for learning to avoid situations
in which the likelihood of noxious stimulation is high. Indeed,
the rodent ventral hippocampus plays an important role in avoid-
ance learning and anxiety-related behaviors (McNaughton and
Wickens, 2003; Bannerman et al., 2004; McNaughton and Corr,
2004; McNaughton, 2006), and the same can be said about the
human hippocampus (Klein et al., 2007). By embedding events or
objects in an emotional context, the hippocampus would draw on
its enteroceptive function and ensure that place preference, place
avoidance, and more sophisticated navigational behaviors (and
derived complex appetitive behaviors) are sensitive and appropri-
ate to the organism’s physiological needs, including its needs for
rewards (for stimuli that are associated with satisfaction of hunger
or thirst, for example) and safety (that is, the absence of noxious
stimulation). Ultimately, a key function of the hippocampus may
be to move the organism from a situation of need or from an
aversive or anxiogenic situation to a situation in which rewards
can be found and in which the risk of harm (or punishment) is
low; and the hippocampus may have done so, early in its phy-
logenetic history, in accordance with the chemical composition
of the environment, and it does so now in accordance with spa-
tial and temporal contingencies inherent in the external physical
world.
Emotional feelings were proposed to reflect the organism’s vis-
ceral and somatic state and to be represented in viscerosensory
and somatosensory cortices (Damasio, 1997, 2001; Damasio et al.,
2000). The insular cortex, in particular, was implicated in con-
scious emotional experience (Damasio, 1997, 2001; Singer, 2007).
The anterior agranular insula – processing visceral and autonomic
information as well as somatic and pain stimuli – is activated in
association with conscious experiences of pain (Rainville et al.,
1997; Ploghaus et al., 2003; Wager et al., 2004; Boly et al., 2007), fear
(Bell et al., 1999), suspicion (Winston et al., 2002), anger, happi-
ness, sadness, disgust, hunger, thirst, as well as reward expectation,
and drug craving (London et al., 2000; Kesner and Gilbert, 2007;
Luhmann, 2009; Naqvi and Bechara, 2009). The anterior insula
may translate information concerning the organism’s bodily state
into motivational functions and decision making biases (Contr-
eras et al., 2007; Luhmann, 2009; Naqvi and Bechara, 2009). The
anterior agranular insula is reciprocally connected with the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
projecting heavily to hypothalamic and brainstem centers, induces
visceral, autonomic, and endocrine alterations that jointly amount
to a “somatic emotional response” (Damasio, 1997) and, owing
to its place in the default-mode network, provides “emotional
biasing signals” to the simulation of the external and internal
world (Raichle et al., 2001). Moreover, the anterior agranular
insula is in a position to control emotional aspects of the sim-
ulated external or internal world via direct projections to the
lateral entorhinal cortex. Information from insular and parain-
sular cortices is forwarded via the lateral entorhinal cortex to
the anterior hippocampus [similarly to olfactory information
and information processed by the perirhinal cortex (reviewed in
Mohedano-Moriano et al., 2007)], enabling representations of the
organism’s bodily state to modulate emotional aspects of event
memories and, hence, the emotional context of conscious experi-
ence, while, at the same time, neocortical processing converging
onto the posterior hippocampus modulates the spatiotemporal
context of consciousness.
Affective information that is taken into account when a repre-
sentation of the animal’s current location or situation is translated
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into an appropriate mode of exploratory, emotional, or instru-
mental behavior can be derived not only from the physiological
state of the organism but also from salient external stimuli. The
basolateral complex of the amygdala, responding to motivationally
salient or emotionally arousing stimuli, modulates the forma-
tion, by the hippocampus, of emotional memories, such as the
memory for the environmental context surrounding an expo-
sure to an aversive stimulus (contextual fear memory) (McGaugh
et al., 1996). The basolateral amygdalar complex projects directly
to hippocampal regions CA3 and CA2. Moreover, the basolat-
eral amygdala modulates sensory information that reaches the
dentate-CA3 network of the anterior hippocampus by way of,
firstly, projections to the anterior lateral temporal cortex (Amaral,
2002; Compton, 2003) [which, as part of the ventral visual stream,
processes object-related information – as well as, in humans,
visual and non-visual information about social and emotional
cues – and forwards this information via perirhinal and lateral
entorhinal cortices to the anterior hippocampus (Kahn et al.,
2008)] and, secondly, projections to perirhinal and entorhinal cor-
tices (Rosenkranz and Johnston, 2006; Bauer et al., 2007). Affect-
related information that impacts on episodic memory formation
includes information about rewards or punishers represented by
the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex, information that reaches
the anterior hippocampus via the lateral entorhinal cortex (and
that, thereby, influences the formation of “arbitrary associations”
between reward or punishment information and information
about the “space out there”) (Rolls and Xiang, 2005).
DREAMS
Dreams associated with REM (rapid-eye-movement) sleep and
conscious perception and hallucinations during wakefulness are
phenomenologically closely related (Behrendt, 2007); and simi-
lar, if not identical, mechanisms should underpin these varieties
of conscious experience. In both, REM sleep and wakefulness,
conscious experience occurs in association with high-frequency,
low-amplitude electroencephalographic activity in the neocortex
(“desynchronization”) (Llinás and Paré, 1991). Both, REM sleep
and waking, are also associated with θ oscillations in the hip-
pocampus. θ Rhythm promotes synchronization of γ oscillatory
activity in the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex during both,
REM sleep and exploratory or attentive behavior (reviewed in
Buzsáki, 1996). In the rat hippocampus, sequences of patterned
neuronal ensemble firing that are modulated by θ rhythm may
reflect experiences during wakefulness; and their reproduction
(corresponding to a reactivation of episodic memory traces) dur-
ing REM sleep may form the content of dream states (Louie and
Wilson, 2001). In particular, pattern formation in CA3 may be
responsible for dream imagery. In the rat hippocampus, θ and γ
oscillations are highly synchronized, during REM sleep, between
dentate gyrus and CA3 (while γ coherence between CA3 and
CA1 is reduced); and it was thought that this synchronization
may reflect the processing, during REM sleep, of event memo-
ries (involving pattern separation and recombination of memory
codes) (Montgomery et al., 2008). It appears that, when dream-
ing, new event codes – reflecting arbitrary associations of objects,
events, and their spatiotemporal and emotional context – are
formed (at each θ cycle) from fragments of previous experiences;
but these codes are generally not retained. Dream memorization
in humans was associated with increased functional connectiv-
ity (evidenced by coherence between local oscillatory activities,
especially in the low-frequency range), during sleep, between rhi-
nal cortices and hippocampus and between anterior and posterior
parts of the hippocampus (Fell et al., 2006). While hippocampus
and rhinal cortices are actively involved in dreaming, the default-
mode network is not. The precuneus and adjacent regions in the
posterior medial parietal cortex show marked deactivation dur-
ing REM sleep, despite extensive evidence pointing to an active
contribution of the precuneus to mental imagery and conscious
experiences of other kinds (reviewed in Cavanna and Trimble,
2006).
Obviously, there is no formation of episodic memories when
there is no consciousness (such as in states of deep sleep or gen-
eral anesthesia). Conversely, when there is consciousness, such as
in dream states (or even in daydreams and states of inner men-
tation), there must be episodic memory formation, too, albeit not
necessarily followed by memory retention and consolidation. It
is claimed here that it is the ongoing process of recurrent forma-
tion or registration of episodic memories, not their consolidation
or retention, that is necessarily linked with consciousness. It could
be objected that there is no obvious abolishment of consciousness
in patients with severe amnesia, however, in patients with amne-
sia due to hippocampal resection, such as famous patient H.M.
(whose hippocampus was not completely removed) (Corkin et al.,
1997), or hippocampal disease, such as patients with Alzheimer’s
disease, we see an inability to retain, not so much to form, episodic
memories; and the same could be said about dreaming. Hence,
consciousness should not be grossly impaired in dementia, as little
as it is impaired in dream states. The argument is that neural activ-
ity patterns forming through recurrent attractor dynamics in CA3
have the informational content of consciousness, in as much as
they have the informational content of episodic memories that are
being formed or that are being recalled ; consciousness is evidence
for ongoing episodic memory formation. Whether these memo-
ries are retained for more than seconds (during which memories
are still recycled in the CA3 state space and available as after-
images) is another matter. In dreaming and dementia, they are,
to a large part, not. The conscious recall of episodic memories
(in imagery), much like the formation of new event memories,
involves attractor dynamics and pattern completion in CA3. Thus,
it is not only the formation of episodic memories but also the recall
of these memories that is accompanied by conscious experience.
Imagery of distant autobiographical events is not impaired in most
patients with dementia, as distant (long-term) memories can be
recalled, so there is no reason to believe that the wakeful conscious
experience of the external world,accompanying event memory for-
mation and the recurring pattern formation by attractor dynamics
in CA3 (regardless as to whether newly formed or reinstated event
codes are subsequently consolidated and retained), is impaired in
dementia.
While it may be true that patients with severe amnesia and
deficits in spatial orientation due to extensive hippocampal dam-
age do not show abnormal consciousness, neither do split-brain
patients, unless closely examined in a neuropsychology labora-
tory. Would even the absence of consciousness, if no recurrent
www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 304 | 7
Behrendt Hippocampus and consciousness
attractor dynamics were to occur in CA3, manifest itself in gross
behavioral abnormalities? It is still not clear what, if anything,
consciousness contributes to behavior (Zeman, 2001). The fact
that we hear language or recognize faces does not mean that con-
sciousness is critically involved in language perception or in face
recognition, other than in registering these processes on a level
of episodic memory, unless it could be argued that consciousness,
that is, the ongoing formation of episodic (declarative) memories,
contributes to self-localization and hence to the advancement of
complex navigationally based behavior, so that, for instance, inter-
mittent goal imagery during speech or thinking, being evidence for
retrieval and partial reinstatement of episodic memories, would
help to direct and reposition the train of speech or thought.
SCHIZOPHRENIC HALLUCINATIONS
Electrical stimulation of the hippocampus in animals can elicit
fixation of attention to an imaginary object (discussed in Isaac-
son, 2002). In humans, electrical stimulation in the region of the
hippocampus and amygdala (medial temporal lobe) can induce
hallucinations, usually in the visual but sometimes in the audi-
tory modality, or vivid experiences of autobiographic memories
(Vignal et al., 2007). The experience of auditory verbal hallu-
cinations (Shergill et al., 2000) or visual hallucinations (Oertel
et al., 2007) by patients with schizophrenia is associated with
hippocampal activation, along with activations in higher-order
neocortical sensory-processing areas (as measured by functional
neuroimaging), while schizophrenic patients’ disposition to expe-
rience hallucinations (and other positive symptoms of schizo-
phrenia) is associated with hyperactivity of the left hippocampus
(and parahippocampal gyrus) (Liddle et al., 2000). Although hip-
pocampal volume is often reduced in patients with schizophrenia,
hippocampal activity (as measured by functional neuroimaging)
is often increased (Heckers, 2001). It has been hypothesized that
hippocampal hyperactivity – possibly reflecting an excess of exci-
tatory neuronal activity – and/or aberrant hippocampal firing are
responsible, more or less directly, for hallucinations and other
positive symptoms in schizophrenia (Liddle et al., 2000; Heck-
ers, 2001; Olypher et al., 2006; Lodge and Grace, 2007). Excessive
or disorganized firing of hippocampal neurons may be due to a
deficit of inhibitory neuronal activity in the hippocampus. Post-
mortem studies of schizophrenia demonstrate GABAergic hypo-
function in the hippocampus, especially in regions CA3 and CA2
(Benes, 2007; Benes et al., 2007). GABAergic hypofunction pre-
dominantly concerns fast-firing interneurons – such as basket
cells, which contain parvalbumin and synapse onto perisomatic
aspects of hippocampal pyramidal cells – given that the expres-
sion of isoenzyme GAD67 is reduced in postmortem hippocampal
samples from schizophrenia patients (Benes et al., 2007). GAD
(glutamic acid decarboxylase) synthesizes GABA in GABAer-
gic neurons, whereby isoenzyme GAD67 is found especially in
GABAergic neurons that fire tonically at a fast rate, such as basket
cells.
Decreased functionality of fast-spiking interneurons, particu-
larly basket cells, leads to a reduction of inhibitory postsynaptic
potentials in hippocampal pyramidal neurons and compensatory
upregulation of postsynaptic GABAA receptors on these neu-
rons (as can be demonstrated in CA3 and CA2 of schizophrenia
patients) (discussed in Heckers et al., 2002; Gisabella et al., 2005).
Decreased functionality of basket cells, in turn, may be attribut-
able to hypofunction of glutamatergic NMDA receptors expressed
on these cells. NMDA receptors on basket cells respond to extra-
cellular glutamate levels, allowing these cells to “sense” the level
of activity of surrounding pyramidal cells and to adjust their
synthesis and release of GABA accordingly. If basket cells are rela-
tively insensitive to extracellular glutamate levels, due to reduced
NMDA-receptor function, GABA synthesis (by GAD67) in these
neurons is downregulated, and less GABA would be released upon
postsynaptic pyramidal cells (reviewed in Lisman et al., 2008). In
patients with schizophrenia, reduced NMDA-receptor function is
a consequence of genetic abnormalities, while, in healthy subjects,
NMDA-receptor dysfunction can be brought about temporarily
by ingestion of NMDA-receptor antagonists (reviewed in Coyle,
2006; Lisman et al., 2008). NMDA-receptor antagonists – blocking
NMDA receptors on GABAergic interneurons and thereby disin-
hibiting hippocampal pyramidal neurons – have psychotomimetic
properties, in that they can induce psychotic experiences, such
as hallucinations, in healthy subjects. Moreover, NMDA-receptor
antagonists can disrupt “prepulse inhibition” of the startle reflex
(the ability of a weak prestimulus to reduce the magnitude of the
startle response to a subsequent intense acoustic stimulus), a deficit
that is commonly seen in patients with schizophrenia. In rats, pre-
pulse inhibition was disrupted by infusion of an NMDA-receptor
antagonist into the dorsal hippocampus, presumably mediated by
disinhibition of hippocampal pyramidal cells (Bakshi and Geyer,
1998).
The effect of early life stresses on hippocampal integrity in
patients with schizophrenia can be modeled in rats by iso-
lation rearing. Rats reared in isolation after weaning show
deficits in prepulse inhibition of the startle reflex in associ-
ation with reduced density of parvalbumin- and calbindin-
immunoreactive interneurons in the hippocampus, reminiscent
of the combination of deficient prepulse inhibition and hip-
pocampal GABAergic hypofunction characteristic of schizophre-
nia (Harte et al., 2007). Parvalbumin immunoreactivity in the
hippocampus is reduced in patients with schizophrenia (as shown
in postmortem samples) (Zhang and Reynolds, 2002). The den-
sity of parvalbumin-expressing basket cells may be reduced
because of excessive glutamatergic neurotransmission in the hip-
pocampus, leading to excitotoxic neuronal damage. Hippocampal
basket cells produce CRH (corticotrophin-releasing hormone),
which acts on CRH1 receptors, which are particularly densely
expressed in region CA3. Life-long overexpression of CRH by
basket cells, as a result of early life stresses (as shown in rats),
and excessive activation of CRH1 receptors on CA3 pyrami-
dal neurons enhances glutamatergic neurotransmission and pro-
motes ongoing excitotoxic neuronal injury and neuronal loss in
CA3, especially in the immature hippocampus (Brunson et al.,
2001).
In another rat model of schizophrenia, excessive glutamatergic
outflow from the basolateral amygdala to regions CA3 and CA2
indirectly causes excitotoxic reductions in GABAergic interneuron
density, especially affecting presumptive fast-firing basket cells,
mirroring postmortem findings of reduced GABAergic interneu-
ron functionality in CA3 and CA2 in schizophrenia (Berretta et al.,
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 304 | 8
Behrendt Hippocampus and consciousness
2004; Gisabella et al., 2005; Benes, 2007). In humans, direct stimu-
lation of the amygdala can elicit feelings of fear and anxiety as well
as complex hallucinations. Brain lesions in or near the amygdala
predispose to schizophreniform psychoses (Fudge and Emiliano,
2003). Social phobia and excessive trait anxiety are associated with
hyperresponsivity of the amygdala (especially on the left) to oth-
ers’ angry or contemptuous emotional expressions (as shown in
neuroimaging studies) (Stein et al., 2002, 2007; Phan et al., 2006).
Importantly, psychotic episodes in schizophrenia, which typically
feature delusional beliefs about specific others causing harm or
posing a threat to the patient, are often preceded or accompanied
by syndromatic or subsyndromatic social phobia characterized by
intense apprehensions, generalized across all social encounters,
about being criticized, negatively evaluated, or rejected by others
(Michail and Birchwood, 2009).
Whether GABAergic hypofunction in the hippocampus is
caused by excitotoxic loss of fast-firing basket cells due to (i)
hyperresponsivity of the amygdala and excessive glutamatergic
outflow from the amygdala to the hippocampus or (ii) early
life stresses and overexpression of CRH; or whether it is caused
by reduced output of basket cells due to (iii) genetically deter-
mined NMDA-receptor dysfunction (Lisman et al., 2008); the
result is a lack of GABA-mediated postsynaptic inhibitory poten-
tials in hippocampal pyramidal cells. Pyramidal cells would be
overexcitable, their firing would be increased, and hippocampal
synaptic plasticity would be enhanced (Gisabella et al., 2005).
Increased or disorganized firing of pyramidal cells would lead
to the formation of event memories and conscious experiences
that are underconstrained by information processed in entorhi-
nal and upstream association neocortical regions. In other words,
hallucinations may be directly attributable to excessive excitabil-
ity of pyramidal neurons in CA3, which would predispose to
distorted or deceptive event code generation. Alternatively, or
in addition, overactive hippocampal pyramidal cells may con-
tribute to psychosis by increasing the number of spontaneously
active dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area (medi-
ated by a multisynaptic pathway via ventral subiculum, ventral
striatum, and ventral pallidum) and, thereby, driving a hyper-
dopaminergic state (Lodge and Grace, 2007; Lisman et al., 2008).
Increased dopamine release in the ventral striatum (from ter-
minals of dopaminergic neurons of the ventral tegmental area)
may be responsible for hyperactivity, agitation, and aggressive-
ness associated with psychosis; in agreement with Liddle et al.
(2000) who thought that, while hyperactivity in the ventral stria-
tum seems to be “associated with acute psychosis, irrespective
of symptom profile,” hyperactivity of the hippocampus is more
specifically associated with “reality distortion” (delusions and
hallucinations) (p. 406).
Olypher et al. (2006) suggested that disorganized firing of
hippocampal pyramidal neurons provides the basis on which “a
pathological steady and stable state of activity”can emerge through
γ synchronization: a “parasitic attractor” “that does not reflect
reality” but a “hallucination” instead (Olypher et al., 2006, p.
166). Furthermore, increased excitability of hippocampal pyrami-
dal cells may account for impairments in Gestalt tasks that require
perceptual grouping of visual stimuli – impairments that can be
identified in patients with schizophrenia, especially patients with
“disorganized schizophrenia” (characterized by prominent hal-
lucinations and thought disorder) (Straube, 1975; Liddle, 1987;
Nuechterlein et al., 1992). Perception entails the segregation of
relevant from irrelevant stimuli, allowing selective association
among relevant stimuli (“subgrouping” or “cognitive coordina-
tion”). In rats, blocking neural activity in one hippocampus (by
injecting tetrodotoxin) induced coactivation, at γ frequencies, of
pyramidal cells in the contralateral hippocampus that initially
fired independently (Olypher et al., 2006). As a result, the abil-
ity of rats to subgroup distal spatial stimuli and segregate them
from irrelevant local stimuli was impaired, preventing these rats
from effectively avoiding regions of the room where footshock was
administered. Coactivation at γ frequencies of initially uncoupled
hippocampal pyramidal neurons prevents the segregation into cell
assemblies encoding independent and unrelated representations,
which would explain impairments in Gestalt perception (Olypher
et al., 2006).
We need to account for the fact that hallucinations in schizo-
phrenia are usually auditory and verbal in form, whereby “voices”
heard by patients characteristically talk about them, as opposed to
addressing them directly. There is clearly an interaction between
a biological disposition to hallucinate, which can be seen in psy-
chologically healthy individuals, too, and attentional pressures of a
particular kind, the focus of which accords with the prominent role
of language in the regulation of self-esteem. Language perception
in patients with schizophrenia is more susceptible to psycholog-
ical suggestion (Haddock et al., 1995), pointing to an excessive
influence of subjective expectation on language perception. What
patients with schizophrenia, who tend to be more fearful of their
social environment, expect to hear – and what they therefore
do hear in form of their voices – are critical and derogatory
comments made by others, reflecting patients’ beliefs about their
subordination, disparagement, and marginalization in society and
interpersonal relationships (Linn, 1977; Nayani and David, 1996;
Birchwood et al., 2000). Attentional pressures reflecting these con-
cerns appear to outweigh peripheral sensory constraints imposed
on reverberatingγ-oscillatory activity in thalamocortical networks
(Behrendt and Young, 2004; Behrendt, 2006). Indeed, stimulus-
induced γ synchronization (Green et al., 1999; Spencer et al.,
2003) – that is, entrainment, by peripheral sensory information, of
intrinsic γ-frequency oscillations (Kwon et al., 1999) – in neocor-
tical regions is impaired in patients with schizophrenia. While this
may be true for paranoid schizophrenia, excessive or disorganized
hippocampal activity may be the predominant pathophysiologi-
cal mechanism of hallucinations in disorganized or hebephrenic
schizophrenia, the clinical picture of which features visual, along-
side auditory, hallucinations as well as prevalent formal thought
disorder.
CONCLUSION
The assignment of a critical role in the generation of conscious
perception – and, ultimately, of conscious experiences of all kinds –
to the hippocampus arises from the following considerations.
Firstly, conscious perception is intricately linked with the for-
mation of episodic (declarative) memories, much as conscious
imagery is linked with episodic memory retrieval. Secondly, con-
scious perception is allocentric. What we experience consciously is
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a world that surrounds us and is independent of our observation,
as is evident when considering the phenomenology of conscious
perception and dreaming, from which more fleeting and seem-
ingly internal types of conscious experience are likely derived.
What is characteristic of conscious perception and dreaming alike
is that objects or events are experienced as being embedded in an
external, that is, allocentric, frame of space and time. The hip-
pocampus has been implicated in the rapid formation and memo-
rization of allocentric representations that embed objects or events
in a world context. Thirdly, the hippocampus is ideally placed
to bind information processed in different sensory-processing
streams. Object-related and emotional information from the lat-
eral entorhinal cortex and spatial contextual information from the
medial entorhinal cortex are combined by hippocampal region
CA3 into unique event memory codes or indices (Morris et al.,
2003; Kesner, 2007; Rolls, 2007). Rapidly forming patterns of neu-
ronal ensemble firing in hippocampal region CA3, which encode
arbitrary associations between objects and their spatiotemporal
and emotional context, that is, associations between information
derived from different neocortical processing streams, may define
the informational content of consciousness. Conscious experience
would be a signature or symbolic representation of the pattern
of activity emerging in CA3 through self-organizing attractor
dynamics.
Conscious experience of a substantial world that seems to
surround us is episodic memory formation in action; conscious
imagery of a less substantial, seemingly internal world is episodic
memory retrieval in action. Every recall (in imagery) of a previous
experience (memory trace of full consciousness) is evidence for
the retrieval of an episodic memory. The ability of the episodic
memory system to extract and recombine elements of previous
experiences can be utilized for the purpose of decision making and
prospective guidance of behavior (goal imagery, outcome simula-
tion). The hippocampus may bind features of novel scenarios for
the purpose of simulating and anticipating future outcomes, sim-
ilarly to how it binds features during the retrieval and conscious
elaboration of past autobiographical events (Addis et al., 2007;
Schacter and Addis, 2007). Outcome simulation (goal imagery)
is supported by competitive activations of the default-mode net-
work during the performance of complex tasks (the pursuit of
hierarchically organized behavioral objectives). Internal menta-
tion, too, draws on the ability of the episodic memory system to
extract and recombine elements of previous experiences; and it,
too, involves the default-mode network. For as long as the subject is
not engaged in the performance of novel or demanding tasks, and
while focused attention is not required, the default-mode network
is engaged in gathering and evaluation of information “broadly
arising in the external and internal milieu” (Raichle et al., 2001,
p. 682). The default-mode network may support monitoring or
observation of the external milieu, on the one hand, and states
of internal mentation and episodic memory recollection, on the
other, precisely insofar as it is functionally coupled with the hip-
pocampus, the critical node, as it is suggested, in all conscious
processes.
Conscious memory recall or outcome simulation (in imagery)
may be attributable to retrieval cues (encoded in neocortical
areas) inducing the reinstatement of neuronal assemblies in CA3
via direct entorhinal input to CA3. Conscious recall of distant
autobiographical memories is mostly intact in amnesic patients
with dementia (including those with Alzheimer’s disease whose
hippocampus undergoes neurodegeneration early in the disease
process), so that it not surprising that these patients are able retain
new declarative information for seconds at least, if not minutes,
and that their consciousness is generally not impaired. What is
impaired in dementia is not so much the ability to form new
episodic (declarative) memories or to recall past memories, which
suggests that rhythmic pattern formation in CA3 still does occur,
but the ability to consolidate new episodic memories. Similarly,
dreaming is evidence for ongoing episodic memory formation, yet
there is hardly any retention. Only small fragments of dream expe-
riences can later be recalled, based on very limited reinstatement
of event codes that were previously fully formed during the dream
experience. Increased activity in the CA3-dentate network (Mont-
gomery et al., 2008), while the default-mode network is inactive,
has been associated with REM sleep and may be responsible for the
dreaming experience. Evidence for GABAergic deficit and pyra-
midal cell hyperexcitability in CA3 in patients with schizophrenia
is consistent with the notion that binding, by the CA3 network,
of weakly related representations underlies hallucinations in this
disorder (Olypher et al., 2006).
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